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CHAPTER 10

BUFFETT’S INVESTING MISTAKES

the idea that you try to time purchases based on what you think business is going to do in the next year or two, I think that’s the greatest mistake that investors make because it’s always uncertain. People say it’s a time of uncertainty. It was uncertain on September 10, 2001, people just didn’t know it. It’s uncertain every single day. So, take uncertainty as part of being involved in investment at all. But uncertainty can be your friend. I mean, when people are scared, they pay less for things. We try to price. We don’t try to time at all.试图根据你认为企业在未来一两年内会做什么来择时购买（timing market) 的想法，我认为这是投资者犯的最大错误，因为它总是不确定的。人们说这是一个充满不确定性的时代。2001 年 9 月 10 日是不确定的，人们只是不知道而已。每一天都是不确定的。因此，将不确定性作为参与投资的一部分。但不确定性可以成为你的朋友。我的意思是，当人们害怕时，他们会为事物付出更少的代价。我们尝试定价。我们根本不尝试择时。

INTRODUCTION

Everybody makes mistakes, even Warren Buffett. But he does not agonize over them. What separates Buffett from others who refuse to admit or examine their errors in judgment is his willingness to scrutinize his decisions and learn from those that did not turn out as he’d expected. As he put it when I visited with him in 2009, only one hitter in Major League Baseball history has hit over .400 (Ted Williams hit.406 in 1941), and even then he failed nearly 60 percent of the time. Worse than taking a swing and a miss, in Buffett’s view, is the failure to recognize an opportunity. “the most important mistakes are ones of omission—those that do not show up in statements, but rather are missed opportunities,” he said. “the things I needed to do, and can do, but did not do them will constitute my biggest mistakes in life.”每个人都会犯错，即使是沃伦·巴菲特。但他并没有为他们而苦恼。巴菲特与其他拒绝承认或检查自己判断错误的人的区别在于，他愿意仔细审查自己的决定，并从那些结果不如预期的案例中吸取教训。正如我在2009年拜访他时所说的那样，美国职业棒球大联盟历史上只有一位击球手的击球率超过.400（泰德·威廉姆斯在1941年击中了.406），即便如此，他也有近60%的时间失败了。在巴菲特看来，比摇摆不定和失误更糟糕的是未能识别机会。“最重要的错误是遗漏——那些没有被买入，被错失了的机会，”他说。“那些我需要做，可以做，但没有做的事情，将构成我一生中最大的错误。

In this chapter, I examine some of Buffett’s investing mistakes—both ill-ad- vised purchases he made and opportunities he missed.在本章中，我研究了巴菲特的一些投资错误——包括他做出的不明智的购买和他错过的机会。

1942: Cities Service城市服务

At age eleven, Buffett purchased his first stock: six shares of Cities Service (a natural gas company)2 preferred stock, for $38 per share (three for himself and three for his sister, Doris).3 Unfortunately, the stock quickly dropped to $27, and he began to sweat because he didn’t want his sister to lose any money. Fortunately, the stock rose back to $40, and he sold it, only to watch it climb to $200 a share.4 This was Buffett’s first lesson in investing in the stock market: Be patient, and don’t let the whims of Mr. Market influence your behavior.11岁时，巴菲特以每股38美元的价格购买了他的第一只股票：6股Cities Service（一家天然气公司）优先股（3股给他自己，3股给他的妹妹Doris）不幸的是，股票很快跌到27美元，他开始出汗，因为他不想让妹妹赔钱。幸运的是，这只股票涨回了40美元，他卖掉了它，却眼睁睁地看着它攀升到每股200美元.4这是巴菲特投资股市的第一课：要有耐心，不要让市场先生的异想天开影响你的行为。

1952: Sinclair Gas Station辛克莱加油站

One of Buffett’s first investment mistakes was the purchase of a Sinclair service station when he was twenty-one years old. He bought it with a friend in Omaha for $2,000, or 20 percent of his net worth at that time. He soon learned that the larger Texaco station across the street consistently outsold his station. This was due to Texaco’s well-known brand and loyal customers. Buffett’s opportunity cost for this deal was $6 billion in today’s dollars.巴菲特的第一个投资错误是在他二十一岁时购买了辛克莱加油站。他和奥马哈的一位朋友一起以 2,000 美元的价格购买了它，占他当时净资产的 20%。他很快了解到，街对面较大的德士古车站的销量一直超过他的车站。这是由于德士古的知名品牌和忠实的客户。巴菲特在这笔交易中的机会成本是60亿美元，以今天的美元计算。

The experience was an early lesson for Buffett. He learned how powerful brand name recognition is.f Beyond that, the experience showed Buffett the essential value of studying a company’s ledger sheet before diving in. He constantly emphasizes the importance of branding, and he makes sure that all of his employees understand its importance too.这段经历是巴菲特的早期教训。除此之外，这段经历还向巴菲特展示了在深入研究公司账本之前研究公司账本的基本价值。他不断强调品牌的重要性，并确保所有员工也了解其重要性。

1952: GEICO

In 1951, Buffett invested more than 50 percent of his net worth in GEICO. (this amounted to 350 shares at $29⅛ a share, for a total cost of $10,281.25.) By the end of 1951, he had a 28 percent return, which was 65 percent of his total net worth. This flush of quick success, however, prompted Buffett to make a serious mistake. In 1952, he sold his entire position in GEICO to invest in Western Insurance Securities. Western Insurance looked like a bargain, and Benjamin Graham had taught Buffett all about bargain-hunting. But over the next twenty years, Buffett would see the value of the GEICO stock he’d sold balloon to well over $1 million. He’d pulled the trigger too early. It taught Buffett a lesson that would shape his investment behavior ever since. He was learning that he needed to hold on to great businesses for the long term.
1951年，巴菲特将其净资产的50%以上投资于GEICO。（这相当于 350 股，每股 291/8 美元，总成本为 10,281.25 美元。到1951年底，他的回报率为28%，占他总净资产的65%。然而，一蹴而就的快速成功促使巴菲特犯了一个严重的错误。1952年，他卖掉了自己在GEICO的全部职位，投资了西方保险证券公司。西方保险看起来很划算，本杰明·格雷厄姆（Benjamin Graham）教过巴菲特所有关于烟蒂股的知识。但在接下来的二十年里，巴菲特将看到他出售的GEICO股票的价值飙升至100万美元以上。他扣动扳机太早了。它给巴菲特上了一课，从那时起就影响了他的投资行为。他了解到，他需要长期持有伟大的企业。

1964: American Express Stock美国运通股票

In 1963, American Express became involved in a fraud that caused losses of $180 million, or $1.52 billion in today’s dollars.G This caused the price of American Express stock to drop more than 50 percent.1963 年，美国运通卷入了一起欺诈案，造成 1.8 亿美元的损失，相当于今天的 15.2 亿美元。这导致美国运通股价下跌超过 50%。

Buffett used Philip Fisher’s scuttlebutt methodology to examine the effect of this incident on the company. He realized that people were still using their American Express cards and checks to pay for restaurant meals, shopping, banking, and traveling. He also evaluated the financials of the company. As a result, in 1964 he invested 25 percent of Berkshire’s partnership assets in American Express—and two years later, when he sold, the shares had doubled in value. The deal made his investors $20 million.巴菲特使用菲利普·费舍尔（Philip Fisher）的scuttlebutt方法论来研究这一事件对公司的影响。他意识到人们仍在使用他们的美国运通卡和支票来支付餐厅用餐、购物、银行业务和旅行的费用。他还评估了公司的财务状况。因此，在1964年，他将伯克希尔25%的合伙资产投资于美国运通，两年后，当他出售时，股票价值翻了一番。这笔交易使他的投资者获得了2000万美元。

No doubt, this was a brilliant investment. However, if he had held on to that investment, it would be worth billions today. So again, he was learning that he needed to hold on to great businesses for the long term.毫无疑问，这是一项了不起的投资。然而，如果他坚持这项投资，今天将价值数十亿美元。因此，他再次了解到，他需要长期持有伟大的企业。

1962 – 1964: Berkshire Hathaway

As I mentioned in chapter 2, Buffett initially offered to sell his stake in a textile business known as Berkshire Hathaway for $11.50 a share in the 1960s. But after receiving a tender offer in the mail for $11.375 per share, he became angry enough to buy the entire company and fire its owner. Buffett then attempted to run the textile business for twenty years as it continued to lose money.正如我在第2章中提到的，巴菲特最初提出在1960年代以每股11.50美元的价格出售他在一家名为伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的纺织企业的股份。但在收到每股11.375美元的要约收购后，他变得非常愤怒，收购了整个公司并解雇了其所有者。巴菲特随后试图经营纺织业务二十年，因为它继续亏损。

The lesson here is pretty clear: When investing, do not act out of emotion. Buffett has called the Berkshire Hathaway purchase the biggest investment mistake of his life—one that cost him billions in today’s dollars. This is a prime example of his insistence that the most important skill in investing is controlling your temperament. I suspect that one reason he kept the failed company’s name for his own investment operation was to be constantly reminded of this act of pique. By his estimation, if he had put the same investment into an insurance company, Berkshire Hathaway the investment firm would be $200 billion more valuable than it already is. As he put it: “When a manager with a reputation for brilliance meets up with a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.”7
这里的教训很清楚：投资时，不要出于情绪而行动。巴菲特称收购伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司是他一生中最大的投资错误，以今天的美元计算，他损失了数十亿美元。这是他坚持认为投资中最重要的技能是控制自己的气质的一个典型例子。我怀疑他为自己的投资业务保留了这家失败公司的名字，其中一个原因是不断提醒他这种激怒行为。据他估计，如果他向一家保险公司投入同样的投资，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司这家投资公司的价值将比现在高出2000亿美元。正如他所说：“当一个以才华著称的经理遇到一个经济状况不佳的糟糕企业时，往往后者占了上风。7

1966: Hockschild, Kohn & Co.

Buffett’s first outright purchase of a business was Hochschild, Kohn & Co., a privately owned Baltimore department store. In 1966, he and two partners, Charlie Munger and Sandy Gottesman, purchased all of the store’s stock.8 With Hochschild Kohn, they were getting (1) a business selling for less than book value,
(2) a great management team,
(3) a cushion of unrecorded real estate value, and
(4) a cushion of significant LIFO inventory.5 LIFO (last in, first out) understates the value of inventory on the books since only low-cost inventory from years past sticks around.
巴菲特第一次直接收购企业是Hochschild， Kohn & Co.，这是一家私人拥有的巴尔的摩百货公司。1966 年，他和两位合伙人查理·芒格 （Charlie Munger） 和桑迪·戈特斯曼 （Sandy Gottesman） 购买了商店的所有存货.8 与霍克希尔德·科恩 （Hochschild Kohn） 合作，他们获得了
（1） 一家以低于账面价值的价格出售的企业，
（2） 一个伟大的管理团队，
（3） 未记录的房地产价值的缓冲，以及
（4） 大量后进先出库存的缓冲.5 后进先出，低估了账面上库存的价值，因为只有过去几年的低成本库存才会存在。

All of these things were potentially valuable attributes. But Hochschild Kohn was, first and foremost, a retailer, and retail is a notoriously challenging sector.10 The problem is that consumer preferences and sales channels are constantly changing, making any competitive advantage difficult to maintain. Low barriers to entry in physical retail also make competitive advantage difficult to maintain. Many investors have learned this fact through painful experience. Consider that longtime retail behemoths Sears and JCPenney are basically dead today. As I write, the impact of shutdowns due to the COVID-19 pandemic is bringing other national retail chains to bankruptcy. Add to this trend the effects of technology. The way we shop is changing radically and rapidly. Nobody, not even Jeff Bezos, was prepared for the way that Amazon and e-commerce generally would destroy traditional brick-and-mortar companies, a phenomenon that accelerated during the shutdowns. This put added pressure on the costs of excess capacity that already existed in retail, and it squeezed margins across traditional sales channels.11
所有这些东西都是潜在的有价值的属性。但Hochschild Kohn首先是一家零售商，而零售业是一个众所周知的具有挑战性的行业.问题在于消费者的偏好和销售渠道在不断变化，这使得任何竞争优势都难以维持。实体零售业的低准入门槛也使得竞争优势难以维持。许多投资者通过痛苦的经历了解到这一事实。想想看，老字号零售巨头西尔斯（Sears）和JCPenney今天基本上已经死了。在我撰写本文时，由于 COVID-19 大流行而关闭的影响正在使其他国家零售连锁店破产。除了这种趋势之外，还有技术的影响。我们的购物方式正在发生根本性的变化。没有人，甚至杰夫·贝佐斯（Jeff Bezos）也没有为亚马逊和电子商务通常会摧毁传统实体公司的方式做好准备，这种现象在封锁期间加速了。这给零售业已经存在的产能过剩成本带来了更大的压力，并挤压了传统销售渠道的利润率11。

Changing consumer preferences, sub-optimal locations, low barriers to entry, and other trend changes left Hochschild Kohn in the dust. When Buffett sold his stake in the retailer three years later, he got back his initial investment—nothing more. His takeaway: It is preferable “to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price.”12 Munger would emphasize this idea when he joined Berkshire Hathaway, and it soon became a core tenet of Buffett’s approach to investing.不断变化的消费者偏好、次优位置、低门槛以及其他趋势变化使 Hochschild Kohn 望尘莫及。三年后，当巴菲特出售他在这家零售商的股份时，他收回了最初的投资——仅此而已。他的结论是：“以合理的价格购买一家出色的公司比以合理的价格购买一家公平的公司更可取。12 芒格在加入伯克希尔哈撒韦公司时会强调这一理念，并很快成为巴菲特投资方法的核心原则。

1966 and 1995: Walt Disney Company

In 1966, Berkshire put 5 percent of the partnership’s money into the Walt Disney Company, amounting to $4 million.13 Within one year, he sold the investment for $6.2 million, making a handsome $2.2 million. Unfortunately, this would turn out to be one of the biggest mistakes of his career. This sale cost Buffett’s partnership $17 billion in future appreciation, plus $1 billion in dividends.14 Think about the opportunity cost—what Buffett could have done with all of that money. At the 1998 shareholders’ meeting Buffett had this to say: “Certainly the Disney sale was a huge mistake, I should have been buying.”15
1966 年，伯克希尔将合伙企业资金的 5% 投入华特迪士尼公司，共计 400 万美元。1年内以620万美元售出，获利220万美元（涨幅50%）。不幸的是，这将是他职业生涯中最大的错误之一。这笔出售使巴菲特的合伙企业在未来升值中损失了170亿美元，外加10亿美元的股息.14想想机会成本——巴菲特可以用所有这些钱做些什么。在1998年的股东大会上，巴菲特说：“当然，迪斯尼的出售是一个巨大的错误，我应该买入。15

He repeated this mistake in 1995. That year, Berkshire owned shares in Capital Cities/ABC, and when Disney announced that it was purchasing Capital Cities/ ABC, Berkshire suddenly had 21 million shares of Disney stock. By the end of 2000, Berkshire sold all of it. If Buffett had held on, the stock would be worth $13.9 billion today.16
他在1995年重蹈覆辙。那一年，伯克希尔拥有Capital Cities/ABC的股份，当迪士尼宣布收购Capital Cities/ABC时，伯克希尔突然拥有了2100万股迪士尼股票。到2000年底，伯克希尔公司将其全部出售。如果巴菲特坚持下去，这只股票今天的价值将达到139亿美元16。

1968: Intel Corporation

Intel was founded in 1968 by semiconductor experts Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore.17 Intel went on to become one of the top technology companies in the world. Buffett had an opportunity to invest in the company in 1968 because he was a trustee with Noyce at Grinnell College in Iowa. Noyce convinced Buffett’s good friend, Joe Rosenfield, and Grinnell College’s investment fund to invest in the company (both $100,000), but Buffett refused because there was no margin of safety. This came to be one of his biggest investment mistakes. But it follows his trend of not investing in technology companies and not having a margin of safety. 英特尔由半导体专家罗伯特·诺伊斯（Robert Noyce）和戈登·摩尔（Gordon Moore）于1968年创立，英特尔后来成为世界顶级科技公司之一。巴菲特在1968年有机会投资该公司，因为他是爱荷华州格林内尔学院诺伊斯的受托人。诺伊斯说服了巴菲特的好朋友乔·罗森菲尔德（Joe Rosenfield）和格林内尔学院的投资基金投资该公司（均为10万美元），但巴菲特拒绝了，因为没有安全边际。这成为他最大的投资错误之一。但这遵循了他不投资科技公司、没有安全边际的趋势。

1975: Waumbec Textile Company

Although he regretted the purchase of the failing textile company Berkshire Hathaway, Buffett did the same thing thirteen years later, when he purchased Waumbec Mills—another New England textile firm. He apparently had learned only part of the necessary lesson. Yes, avoid investing out of emotion. But Buffett would see that he also needed to grasp the deeper lesson about not being seduced by bargains for their own sake.尽管他对收购失败的纺织公司伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司感到遗憾，但巴菲特在十三年后做了同样的事情，当时他收购了另一家新英格兰纺织公司Waumbec Mills。他显然只学到了一部分必要的教训。是的，避免出于情感而投资。但巴菲特会明白，他还需要掌握更深层次的教训，即不要为了便宜货而被便宜货所诱惑。

“Can you believe that in 1975 I bought Waumbec Mills—another New England textile company?” he wrote to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders in his 2014 letter. “Of course, the purchase price was a ‘bargain’ based on the assets we received and the projected synergies with Berkshire’s existing textile business. Nevertheless— surprise, surprise—Waumbec was a disaster, with the mill having to be closed down not many years later.”18
“你能相信我在1975年收购了另一家新英格兰纺织公司Waumbec Mills吗？”他在2014年写给伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东的信中写道。“当然，基于我们收到的资产以及与伯克希尔现有纺织业务的预期协同效应，收购价格是’烟蒂式的’。然而，出乎意料的是，万贝克是一场灾难，工厂不得不在几年后关闭。18

Finally, Buffett got it: “If at first, you don’t succeed, move on to a new strategy,” he told CNBC in 2017.15 Buffett also learned the disadvantages of owning a business dependent on a product or service subject to compression of margins.最后，巴菲特明白了：“如果一开始你没有成功，那就转向新的战略，”他在 2017 年告诉 CNBC。巴菲特还学习到拥有产品或服务利润容易受到挤压的的企业，其缺点显而易见。

1980 – 1990s: Microsoft

Buffett famously missed the opportunity to invest in Microsoft. As we have seen, he only feels comfortable investing in companies or industries he understands. This rule disqualified him from investing in Microsoft in its early days. Later, when Buffett developed a friendship with Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates, he worried that investing in Gates’s company would put their relationship at risk or look improper to regulators, who might wonder about the possibility of the two men sharing insider information. The opportunity cost to Buffett was billions of dollars.众所周知，巴菲特错过了投资Microsoft的机会。正如我们所看到的，他只愿意投资他所了解的公司或行业。这条规则使他在早期没有资格投资Microsoft。后来，当巴菲特与Microsoft联合创始人比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）建立友谊时，他担心投资盖茨的公司会使他们的关系处于危险之中，或者在监管机构看来是不恰当的，他们可能会怀疑两人分享内幕信息的可能性。巴菲特的机会成本是数十亿美元。

In hiring Todd Combs and Ted Weschler as fund managers in 2010 and 2012, Buffett was clearly acknowledging that his ignorance of tech would cost Berk- shire, and this could no longer stand.在2010年和2012年聘请托德·库姆斯（Todd Combs）和泰德·韦施勒（Ted Weschler）担任基金经理时，巴菲特清楚地承认，他对科技的无知将使伯克希尔付出代价，而这已经站不住脚了。

My takeaway: Do not be afraid to educate yourself on areas outside your field of competence—or else be prepared to delegate to those with greater knowledge.我的结论是：不要害怕在你能力领域之外的领域进行自我教育，否则就要准备好委托给那些知识更丰富的人。

1989: US Airways

Buffett has seen consistently lackluster results investing in airlines. Yet he has repeatedly come back to the well, such that he joked in 2002 that he was an “aeroholic.”20
巴菲特投资航空公司的业绩一直乏善可陈。然而，他一再回到井边，以至于他在2002年开玩笑说自己是个“航空狂”。20

His first foray into airlines came in 1989, when US Airways chief executive officer (CEO) Ed Colodny convinced Buffett to buy in as a way of protecting the airline from hostile takeover by a hedge fund. Buffett purchased $358 million in convertible preferred stock with an annual rate of return of 9.25 percent.21 The strike price to turn his investment into stock was $60, and the price when he bought was $52. But Buffett was never able to convert his investment because the stock never hit $60. Colodny recalled Buffett cashing out as soon as he was able and walking away with his principal back, but not much more.22
1989年，他首次涉足航空公司，当时全美航空公司首席执行官埃德·科洛德尼（Ed Colodny）说服巴菲特购买，以保护航空公司免受对冲基金的敌意收购。巴菲特购买了3.58亿美元的可转换优先股，年回报率为9.25%.21将他的投资转化为股票的执行价格为60美元，而他购买时的价格为52美元。但巴菲特永远无法转换他的投资，因为该股从未达到60美元。科洛德尼回忆说，巴菲特一有机会就兑现，然后带着本金走了，但仅此而已22。

In a 2002 interview, Buffett acknowledged his penchant for getting burned by airline stocks, observing that the industry had “eaten up capital over the past century like almost no other business because people seem to keep coming back to it and putting fresh money in.”23
在2002年的一次采访中，巴菲特承认他喜欢被航空股烧掉，他观察到这个行业“在过去的一个世纪里几乎像其他行业一样消耗了资本，因为人们似乎不断回到它并投入新的资金。23

Airlines’ enormous fixed costs, strong labor unions, and commodity pricing combined to make a particularly poor recipe for success, he said. And yet he did not learn his lesson with US Airways. Buffett would go on to buy stock in four other airlines between 2016 and 2020.他说，航空公司巨大的固定成本、强大的工会和大宗商品定价相结合，使得成功的秘诀特别糟糕。然而，他并没有从全美航空公司吸取教训。巴菲特在2016年至2020年期间继续购买其他四家航空公司的股票。

“I have an 800 number now that I call if I get the urge to buy an airline stock,” he joked. “I call at two in the morning and I say: ‘My name is Warren, and I am an aeroholic.’ And then they talk me down.”24
他开玩笑说：“我现在有一个800号码，如果我有购买航空公司股票的冲动，我会打电话。“我凌晨两点打电话说：’我叫沃伦，我是一个航空狂。然后他们就劝我失望了。24

Buffett’s decisions around airline investments seem to have been influenced by his expectation that consolidation within the industry would lead to increasing profitability. He also may have overemphasized the benefit of high barriers to entry as a sustainable means of producing attractive returns for shareholders.巴菲特在航空投资方面的决定似乎受到了他的预期的影响，即行业内的整合将导致盈利能力的提高。他也可能过分强调了高进入壁垒的好处，认为这是为股东创造有吸引力的回报的可持续手段。

1991: Salomon Brothers

One of Buffett’s worst investments was Salomon Brothers. A series of scandals in the early 1990s nearly forced Salomon into bankruptcy, which prompted him to launch an emergency takeover of the firm. He already owned a $700 million stake in Salomon (12 percent of the company, which he’d acquired in 1987).25
巴菲特最糟糕的投资之一是所罗门兄弟。1990 年代初期的一系列丑闻几乎迫使所罗门破产，这促使他紧急接管了该公司。他已经拥有所罗门公司7亿美元的股份（该公司12%的股份，他于1987年收购）25。

One of the scandals involved a trader who submitted illegal bids for government securities in late 1990. The trader attempted to corner the market by purchasing more than the 35 percent share any single bidder was permitted to submit in an auction of U.S. Treasury securities.26 The bank’s internal investigators found two illegal bids worth $6 billion in five-year Treasury notes.27 But when this maneuver came to light, the trader was not fired. The following year, in May 1991, Salomon repeated the maneuver, again cornering the Treasuries market. But this time the Securities and Exchange Commission caught on. Salomon was fined $290 million, and its CEO, John Gutfreund, was fired.28 The trader responsible for both instances was sentenced to four months in a minimum- security prison for lying to regulators.25
其中一起丑闻涉及一名交易员，他在1990年底提交了非法的政府证券投标。该交易员试图通过购买任何单个竞标者在美国国债拍卖中被允许提交的 35% 以上的份额来垄断市场.26 该银行的内部调查人员发现了两份价值 60 亿美元的五年期国债的非法投标.27 但当这种策略被曝光时，该交易员并没有被解雇。次年，即1991年5月，所罗门重复了这一策略，再次垄断了美国国债市场。但这一次，美国证券交易委员会（SEC）抓住了机会。所罗门被罚款2.9亿美元，其首席执行官约翰·古特弗伦德（John Gutfreund）被解雇28，负责这两起事件的交易员因向监管机构撒谎而被判处最低安全监狱四个月25。

All of this illegal activity compelled Buffett to testify at a congressional hearing. He began by apologizing for the illegal deeds, emphasizing that most Salomon employees were honorable people, and promising the firm’s wholehearted cooperation with any federal investigation. “In the end, the spirit about compliance is as important or more so than words about compliance,” he said. Then he continued: I want the right words, and I want the full range of internal controls. But I also have asked every Salomon employee to be his or her own compliance officer. After they first obey all rules, I then want employees to ask themselves whether they are willing to have any contemplated act appear the next day on the front page of their local paper, to be read by their spouses, children, and friends, with the reporting done by an informed and critical reporter. If they follow this test, they need not fear my other message to them: Lose money for the firm, and I will be understanding; lose a shred of reputation for the firm, and I will be ruthless.30
所有这些非法活动迫使巴菲特在国会听证会上作证。他首先为这些非法行为道歉，强调所罗门的大多数员工都是值得尊敬的人，并承诺公司将全心全意地配合任何联邦调查。“归根结底，关于合规的精神与关于合规的言辞一样重要，甚至更重要，”他说。然后他继续说：“我想要正确的词语，我想要全方位的内部控制。但我也要求所罗门的每一位员工都成为他或她自己的合规官。在他们首先遵守所有规则之后，我希望员工问问自己，他们是否愿意让任何预期的行为出现在第二天当地报纸的头版上，由他们的配偶、孩子和朋友阅读，并由知情和挑剔的记者进行报道。如果他们遵循这个测试，他们就不必害怕我给他们的另一个信息：为公司赔钱，我会理解的;为公司失去一丝声誉，我将变得无情30。

Buffett got out of the whole affair when Travelers purchased Salomon Brothers for $9 billion in 1997. Buffett’s take was $1.7 billion, so he made a $1 billion profit.30 In this purely fiscal sense, Salomon was not technically a mistake. But it left a bad taste in Buffett’s mouth, which underscored his longtime focus on the importance of honesty and integrity to any brand.
巴菲特在1997年以90亿美元的价格收购所罗门兄弟（Salomon Brothers）时退出了整个事件。巴菲特的收益是17亿美元，所以他获得了10亿美元的利润.30从这个纯粹的财政意义上讲，所罗门在技术上并不是一个错误。但这在巴菲特的嘴里留下了不好的味道，这突显了他长期以来对诚实和正直对任何品牌的重要性的关注。

1993: Dexter Shoe Company

In 1993, Buffett bought Dexter Shoe Company for $433 million in Berkshire stock.32 At the time, Dexter was one of the most reputable shoe companies in the world. My feeling is that Buffett succumbed to overconfidence bias and failed to account for the effects of cheap labor from overseas and how they might compromise Dexter’s brand-based competitive advantage.1993 年，巴菲特以 4.33 亿美元的伯克希尔股票收购了德克斯特鞋业公司.当时，德克斯特是世界上最负盛名的鞋业公司之一。我的感觉是，巴菲特屈服于过度自信的偏见，没有考虑到来自海外的廉价劳动力的影响，以及它们如何损害德克斯特基于品牌的竞争优势。

Buffett said this in the 2015 shareholder letter: “Our once-prosperous Dexter operation folded, putting 1,600 employees in a small Maine town out of work. Many were past the point in life at which they could learn another trade. We lost our entire investment, which we could afford, but many workers lost a livelihood they could not replace.”33 The value of that stock today would be around $9 billion.34 More important, though, is the opportunity cost and what could have been done with that $9 billion.巴菲特在2015年的股东信中说：“我们曾经繁荣的德克斯特公司倒闭了，缅因州一个小镇上的1600名员工失业了。许多人已经过了可以学习另一门手艺的人生阶段。我们失去了我们所能承受的全部投资，但许多工人失去了他们无法替代的生计。今天这只股票的价值约为 90 亿美元.然而，更重要的是机会成本以及这 90 亿美元可以做什么。

1998: General Re

In 1998, Berkshire issued 272,200 shares to purchase the reinsurance company General Re, an act that increased the volume of Berkshire’s shares by 21.8 percent.35 Two things went wrong with this deal. The company had too much expo- sure to financial derivatives, and it had a bad reputation. Buffett stated at the 2009 Berkshire annual meeting, “I was dead wrong, in 1998, when I bought it, in thinking that it was the Gen Re of fifteen years earlier, which had absolutely the premier reputation in the insurance world.”36
1998 年，伯克希尔发行了 272,200 股股票以收购再保险公司通用再保险，此举使伯克希尔的股票数量增加了 21.8%。该公司对金融衍生品有太多的敞口，而且名声不好。巴菲特在2009年伯克希尔年会上表示，“1998年，当我买下它时，我以为它是15年前的Gen Re，在保险界绝对享有盛誉，我大错特错了。36

Buffett avoided disaster due to his extensive business experience. On the derivative front, he instructed the Gen Re team to unwind as many of the company’s derivatives as possible, as quickly as possible. This was Buffett acting swiftly to limit the impact of a potential disaster rather than waiting around to see if anything would get better, just as he did in early 2020 with the airline stocks.37 He also replaced the top management team. “My error caused Berk- shire shareholders to give far more than they received (a practice that—despite the Biblical endorsement—is far from blessed when you are buying businesses),” Buffett acknowledged.38
巴菲特由于其丰富的商业经验而避免了灾难。在衍生品方面，他指示Gen Re团队尽快尽可能多地平仓公司的衍生品。这是巴菲特迅速采取行动以限制潜在灾难的影响，而不是像他在 2020 年初对航空公司股票所做的那样，等待看是否有任何情况会好转.37 他还更换了高层管理团队。巴菲特承认：“我的错误导致伯克希尔股东付出的远远超过他们得到的（尽管有圣经的认可，但这种做法在你购买企业时远非祝福）38。

In plain terms, his mistake cost Berkshire shareholders $800 million in 2001. The lessons here? Always run through a worst-case-scenario analysis and deter- mine what an action could cost you.35 Also, if something goes wrong, it is sensible to cut your losses and get out as soon as possible. Furthermore, good managers are key to the success of a business.40
简而言之，他的错误在2001年使伯克希尔的股东损失了8亿美元。教训是如果出现问题，减少损失并尽快退出是明智的。此外，优秀的管理者是企业成功的关键。

1998–Present: Google

Sometimes there are opportunities right under your nose.41 Google’s founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page approached Buffett in the late 2000s about investing in their company, and he passed, incorrectly viewing Google as merely another search engine rather than a powerful advertising vehicle. He should have known better, because Berkshire Hathaway was already familiar with Google’s business model, having used it to advertise GEICO. Once again, Buffett and Munger missed out on a tech investment that could have netted them billions of dollars.41
谷歌的创始人谢尔盖·布林（Sergey Brin）和拉里·佩奇（Larry Page）在2000年代后期与巴菲特（Buffett）就投资他们的公司进行了接触，他错过了，错误地将谷歌视为另一个搜索引擎，而不是一个强大的广告工具。他应该知道得更多，因为伯克希尔哈撒韦公司已经熟悉谷歌的商业模式，并用它来为GEICO做广告。巴菲特和芒格再一次错过了一项本可以为他们带来数十亿美元净收益的科技投资。

2003: Walmart

In the 1990s, Buffett was buying Walmart. His goal was to purchase 100 million shares at $23 a share. However, as he was buying, the stock moved up a few pennies over his ideal price, so in 2003 he quit buying.42 At the 2004 Berkshire share- holder meeting, Buffett stated the following:在1990年代，巴菲特收购了沃尔玛。他的目标是以每股23美元的价格购买1亿股股票。然而，当他买入时，股票比他的理想价格高出几美分，所以在2003年他放弃了买入.在2004年伯克希尔股东大会上，巴菲特表示：

I cost us about $10 billion. And Charlie said it didn’t sound like the worst idea I ever came up with, which is—from him, I mean, it was just ungodly praise. And then, you know, we bought a little and then it moved up a little bit. And I thought, “Well, you know, maybe it will come back” or what—Who knows what I thought? I mean, you know, only my psychiatrist can tell me. And that thumb sucking, reluctance to pay a little more—the current cost is in the area of $10 billion.43
我花了我们大约100亿美元。查理说，这听起来不像是我想出的最糟糕的主意，也就是说——从他那里，我的意思是，这只是不敬虔的赞美。然后，你知道，我们买了一点，然后它上涨了一点。我想，“好吧，你知道，也许它会回来”或者什么——谁知道我在想什么？我的意思是，你知道，只有我的心理医生才能告诉我。还有吮吸拇指，不愿意多付一点钱——目前的成本在100亿美元左右。

As of 2019, that 100 million-share position would have been worth around $12 billion, and that excludes dividends over the past two decades. The total return is substantially higher. Walmart’s total annual return for shareholders is 7.5 percent since the start of 2004.44
截至 2019 年，这 1 亿股头寸的价值约为 120 亿美元，这不包括过去二十年的股息。总回报率要高得多。自2004年初以来，沃尔玛的股东年总回报率为7.5%。

The primary takeaway from this investment blunder is it’s better to pay for quality if you believe in your idea. There is no perfect price. If you think a stock is undervalued, paying an extra 5 percent for it is not going to kill you.45
从这个(沃尔玛）投资失误中得到的主要启示是，如果你相信你的想法，最好为质量买单。没有完美的价格。如果你认为一只股票被低估了，为它多付5%的钱不会杀死你。

2006–2014: Tesco

Buffett bought his first shares of Tesco, the largest grocery chain in Britain, in 2006. But changes in the company’s management began to take hold, and the result was a steady decrease in the company’s profitability. Buffett did not heed the signs. Despite a profit warning in 2012, Buffett increased his Tesco stake to over 5 percent. The following year, when he had finally “soured” on the company’s management, he sold o9 114 million of his 415 million shares.
巴菲特于2006年购买了英国最大的杂货连锁店乐购（Tesco）的第一股股票。但公司管理层的变化开始显现，结果是公司的盈利能力稳步下降。巴菲特没有注意到这些迹象。尽管在2012年发出了盈利警告，但巴菲特仍将他在乐购的股份增加到5%以上。第二年，当他终于对公司管理层感到“不满”时，他卖掉了4.15亿股股票中的91.14亿股。

Buffett’s fault here was holding on—perhaps due to loss aversion—when he should have divested completely. Tesco’s problems did not improve. Instead, its market share continued to shrink, its margins were being squeezed, and account- ing problems began to surface.巴菲特的错在于，在他应该完全撤资的时候，他坚持了下来——也许是出于对损失的厌恶。乐购的问题没有改善。相反，它的市场份额继续萎缩，利润率受到挤压，会计问题开始浮出水面。

Buffett continued to sell Tesco shares throughout 2014, and his eventual aEer- tax losses totaled $444 million, or one-fifth of 1 percent of Berkshire’s net worth.46
巴菲特在2014年继续出售乐购股票，他最终的税损失总额为4.44亿美元，占伯克希尔净资产1%的五分之一。

The lesson? Get out at the first whiff of poor management, or else replace the management.（在TESCO)教训是什么？在管理不善的第一时间就离开，否则就更换管理层。

“My leisurely pace in making sales would prove expensive. Charlie calls this sort of behavior ‘thumb-sucking.’ (Considering what my delay cost us, he is being kind),” Buffett would later concede. “In the world of business, bad news often surfaces serially: You see a cockroach in your kitchen; as the days go by, you meet his relatives.”47
“我犹豫不决会变得很昂贵。查理称这种行为为“吮吸拇指”。（考虑到我的拖延让我们付出了什么代价，他很善良），“巴菲特后来承认。“在商业世界中，坏消息经常连续出现：你看到厨房里有一只蟑螂;随着时间的流逝，你会见到他的亲戚。47

2008: ConocoPhillips

As I detailed in the discussion of herding bias in chapter 7, Buffett disregarded his tried-and-true rule about buying when there is blood in the streets. Instead, he let his emotions take over and purchased ConocoPhillips when oil was near its high. This move wound up costing Berkshire several billion dollars.正如我在第7章中对羊群偏见的讨论中所详述的那样，巴菲特无视他久经考验的规则，即在血流满城时买入。相反，他让自己的情绪占据了上风，并在油价接近高位时购买了康菲石油公司。这个举动最终使伯克希尔损失了数十亿美元。

2011: Lubrizol Corporation路博润公司

In early January 2011, David Sokol, a Berkshire executive, purchased a large amount of stock in Lubrizol and then told Buffett about the company. It would be an attractive purchase, he said. Berkshire heeded this advice and bought Lubrizol in March 2011 for around $9 billion. eat deal made Sokol $3 million in increased stock value—a fact that did not go unnoticed by the media.2011年1月初，伯克希尔高管大卫·索科尔（David Sokol）购买了大量路博润股票，然后向巴菲特介绍了该公司的情况。他说，这将是一笔有吸引力的收购。伯克希尔听从了这一建议，于2011年3月以约90亿美元的价格收购了路博润。这笔交易使索科尔的股票价值增加了300万美元——这一事实并没有被媒体忽视。

The executive eventually resigned.48 But Buffett realized, too late, that he had not done enough due diligence when purchasing Lubrizol. Buffett’s lesson: Your reputation is your most valuable asset. Do everything you can to protect it by asking more questions than you think are necessary.49
48 但巴菲特意识到，在购买路博润时，他没有做足够的尽职调查，为时已晚。巴菲特（在路博润和高管 大卫索科尔）的教训：你的声誉是你最宝贵的资产。尽你所能保护它，提出比你认为必要的更多的问题。

2011 – 2018: IBM

In 2011, Berkshire Hathaway bought 64 million shares of IBM for $10.7 billion (an average price of $170 each).50 At the time, Buffett was more attracted to IBM’s business in ancillary office services than computer hardware. It looked like business services would offer stability and growth due to IBM’s dominant position in outsourcing information technology. But a few years later, cloud computing would begin its ascent, drastically undercutting IBM’s position.2011 年，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司以 107 亿美元（平均每股 170 美元）的价格购买了 6400 万股 IBM 股票。由于IBM在外包信息技术方面的主导地位，商业服务似乎将提供稳定性和增长。但几年后，云计算开始崛起，大大削弱了IBM的地位。

By 2017, Buffett was more sanguine about the future of Apple than he was about IBM, and he continued to lose confidence in Big Blue as it became increasingly clear that IBM was on the wrong side of the changes shaping the industry.到2017年，巴菲特对苹果的未来比对IBM更乐观，他继续对蓝色巨人失去信心，因为越来越明显的是，IBM在塑造行业的变化中站在了错误的一边。

“When it got above $180, we actually sold a reasonable amount of stock,”f£ he said at the time. By May 2018, Buffett had sold all of his shares in the mid-$140 range.52
“当它超过180美元时，我们实际上卖出了合理数量的股票，”他当时说。到 2018 年 5 月，巴菲特以 140 美元左右的价格出售了所有股票52。

2013: Energy Future Holdings

Energy Future Holdings (EFH) was founded in 2007 with $8 billion in equity and a lot of debt. Its purpose was to purchase electric utilities assets in Texas. Buffett plunged into this investment by purchasing about $2 billion of EFH’s debt, a move he made without consulting Munger. In his 2013 letter to shareholders, Buffett acknowledged this mistake. It underscores the importance of a core principle he had previously used to great advantage: Have someone at hand who can act as a sounding board for your ideas and isn’t afraid to disagree with you. Buffett’s lack of consultation with Munger likely cost Berkshire $873 million. “This was a big mistake,” he told shareholders. “Next time I’ll call Charlie.”53,54
Energy Future Holdings （EFH） 成立于 2007 年，拥有 80 亿美元的股权和大量债务。其目的是购买德克萨斯州的电力公司资产。巴菲特通过购买EFH约20亿美元的债务来投入这项投资，这是他在没有咨询芒格的情况下做出的举动。在2013年致股东的信中，巴菲特承认了这一错误。这凸显了他以前曾使用过的一个核心原则的重要性：手头有一个人可以充当你想法的传声筒，并且不怕不同意你的观点。巴菲特缺乏与芒格的协商可能会使伯克希尔损失8.73亿美元。“这是一个很大的错误，”他告诉股东。“下次我会打电话给查理的。”

2015: Kraft Foods and H. J. Heinz Co.

On February 14, 2013, Berkshire and 3G Capital purchased H. J. Heinz Co. for $28 billion. In 2015, they invested $10 billion and merged Kraft Foods with H. J. Heinz. This valued Kraft at about $46 billion.55
2013 年 2 月 14 日，伯克希尔和 3G Capital 以 280 亿美元收购了亨氏公司。2015 年，他们投资 100 亿美元，将卡夫食品与亨氏合并。这相当于卡夫的市值约为460亿美元。

But most of the Kraft Heinz portfolio included “center of the store” main- stays, while consumer tastes were rapidly turning toward periphery and organic products. A major part of this shift came in the form of increased competition from private-label brands, like Kirkland from Costco. Walmart, Target, Kroger, and other food retailers also have been expanding their private-label brands. For example, Kroger’s Simple Truth organic food line is now a $3 billion brand.56
但卡夫亨氏的大部分产品组合都包括“商店中心”的中流砥柱，而消费者的口味正在迅速转向外围和有机产品。这种转变的主要部分是来自自有品牌的竞争加剧，比如Costco的Kirkland。沃尔玛（Walmart）、塔吉特（Target）、克罗格（Kroger）和其他食品零售商也一直在扩大其自有品牌。例如，克罗格（Kroger）的简单真理（Simple Truth）有机食品系列现在是一个价值30亿美元的品牌。

Buffett failed to anticipate this shift in consumer taste, as well as the ways that other food outlets were meeting it. This increasing competition, reduced sales, and lower profits translated into a $15.4 billion write-down for Kraft in 2019, which decreased its dividend by 36 percent, from $2.50 to $1.60 per share annually.57
巴菲特没有预料到消费者口味的这种转变，以及其他食品店满足这种转变的方式。竞争加剧、销售额下降和利润下降导致卡夫在 2019 年减记了 154 亿美元，股息减少了 36%，从每年每股 2.50 美元降至 1.60 美元。

Private labels have continued to increase their market share. Their sales made up 16 percent of the market before the start of the pandemic in 2020, up 2 per- cent since 2014. And while conventional product sales grew by 24 percent, private-brand sales significantly outpaced that rate, surging by 29 percent.58
自有品牌的市场份额持续增加。在 2020 年大流行开始之前，他们的销售额占市场的 16%，自 2014 年以来增长了 2%。虽然传统产品的销售额增长了24%，但自有品牌的销售额大大超过了这一速度，飙升了29%。

“It’s still a wonderful business, in that it uses about $7 billion of tangible assets and earns $6 billion pretax on that,” Buffett told CNBC. But he admitted in hindsight that he had overpaid for Kraft: “We paid $100 billion in tangible assets. So, for us, it has to earn $107 billion, not just the $7 billion that the business employs.”59
“这仍然是一项了不起的业务，因为它使用了大约70亿美元的有形资产，并从中赚取了60亿美元的税前收入（ROIC 接近100%）”巴菲特告诉CNBC。但他事后承认，他为卡夫多付了钱：“我们支付了1000亿美元的有形资产。因此，对我们来说，它必须赚取 1070 亿美元，而不仅仅是企业投入的的 70 亿美元。

2015–2016: Precision Castparts Corporation

Berkshire Hathaway purchased Precision Castparts Corporation for $32.1 billion in 2016.60 The company was the world’s premier supplier of key aerospace components, such as fasteners and turbine blades for large aircraft, as well as pipes for power stations and the oil-and-gas sector.
伯克希尔哈撒韦公司于2016年以321亿美元的价格收购了Precision Castparts Corporation.该公司是全球首屈一指的关键航空航天部件供应商，例如大型飞机的紧固件和涡轮叶片，以及发电站和石油和天然气行业的管道。

One of the firms that Precision Castparts owned was a German company, Schultz Holding, which it had purchased for $870 million in 2017. But after closing the deal, Precision Castparts discovered that Schultz had grossly inflated its value through fraudulent accounting maneuvers.Precision Castparts 拥有的一家公司是一家德国公司 Schultz Holding，该公司于 2017 年以 8.7 亿美元的价格收购了该公司。但在完成交易后，Precision Castparts发现舒尔茨通过欺诈性会计手段严重夸大了其价值。

Arbitrators agreed. In 2020, Precision Castparts won a $696 million ruling on the matter, and Buffett admitted his misjudgment of the books: “I was wrong . . . in judging the average amount of future earnings and, consequently, wrong in my calculation of the proper price to pay for the business,” he wrote. “[Precision Castparts] is far from my first error of that sort. But it’s a big one. I’ll make more mistakes in the future—you can bet on that.”61
仲裁员表示同意。2020 年，Precision Castparts 就此事赢得了 6.96 亿美元的裁决，巴菲特承认他对账簿的误判：“我错了……在判断未来收入的平均金额时，因此，我错误地计算了为企业支付的适当价格，“他写道。“[精密铸件]远不是我第一次犯这样的错误。但这是一个大问题。我以后会犯更多的错误——你可以打赌。61

2019: Amazon

Buffett failed to invest in Bezos’s revolutionary company until 2019. “I have been an idiot for not buying,” he told CNBC, by way of announcing that this was about to change.62
巴菲特直到 2019 年才投资贝佐斯的革命性公司。“我一直是个不买的白痴，”他告诉CNBC，宣布这种情况即将改变。

Berkshire began buying Amazon in 2019. As of March 2022, Berkshire owned 533,300 shares of Amazon at $2,910 a share, equal to $1.55 billion. Amazon recently announced a 20-for-1 stock split (pending shareholder approval). This means that for every share of Amazon you have, you would get nineteen more shares. It’s the same amount—you just have more shares of a cheaper stock. This gives the opportunity for more investors to purchase Amazon. At the end of the second quarter of 2022, Berk- shire owned 10,666,000 shares of Amazon. As of August 2022, it is worth $1.43 billion.
伯克希尔于2019年开始收购亚马逊。截至 2022 年 3 月，伯克希尔以每股 2,910 美元的价格持有亚马逊 533,300 股股票，相当于 15.5 亿美元。亚马逊最近宣布了 20 比 1 的股票拆分（有待股东批准）。这意味着，对于您拥有的每一份亚马逊股票，您将获得 19 份以上的股票。这是相同的数量——你只是拥有更多更便宜的股票。这为更多投资者提供了购买亚马逊的机会。截至 2022 年第二季度末，伯克希尔拥有 10,666,000 股亚马逊股票。截至 2022 年 8 月，它的价值为 14.3 亿美元。

2016 – 2020: Airlines

As noted earlier in this chapter, as well as in chapter 9, Berkshire invested in American Airlines, United Airlines, Delta Airlines, and Southwest Airlines in November 2016. Then, during the 2020 shareholder meeting, Buffett announced that Berkshire had sold its $6.1 billion position in airlines because of the coronavirus pandemic. This contributed to losses of $50 billion for Berkshire Hathaway in the first quarter of 2020—the largest quarterly loss in the investment firm’s history.如本章前面以及第9章所述，伯克希尔于2016年11月投资了美国航空公司、联合航空公司、达美航空公司和西南航空公司。然后，在 2020 年股东大会上，巴菲特宣布，由于冠状病毒大流行，伯克希尔已经出售了其在航空公司的 61 亿美元头寸。这导致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司在 2020 年第一季度亏损 500 亿美元，这是该投资公司历史上最大的季度亏损。

Some may disagree with my labeling the airline stocks as one of Buffett’s mistakes, considering that it was the virus, not any failure of judgment or business insight, that precipitated the airlines’ severe losses. But I disagree. Buffett’s prior investment experience had taught him that airlines were a bad bet, and he disregarded his own hard-earned lesson. Pandemic or not, the airline industry is highly sensitive to economic cycles. Buffett knew this and had already bemoaned its high fixed costs and unionized labor. Despite all of this data, he purchased $9,755,058,860 in airline stocks, making them 4.5 percent of Berkshire’s total portfolio.有些人可能不同意我把航空股贴上巴菲特的错误之一的标签，认为是病毒，而不是任何判断力或商业洞察力的失败，导致了航空公司的严重损失。但我不同意。巴菲特之前的投资经验告诉他，航空公司是一个糟糕的赌注，他无视自己来之不易的教训。无论是否大流行，航空业对经济周期都高度敏感。巴菲特知道这一点，并且已经哀叹其高昂的固定成本和工会劳工。尽管有所有这些数据，他还是购买了9,755,058,860美元的航空股，占伯克希尔总投资组合的4.5%。

What accounts for this failure to learn from past experience? My belief is that consolidation within the industry, which created less competition between airlines on ticket prices, reassured Buffett that this era would be different and lead to attractive returns for shareholders. This might have been true. But the coronavirus showed how truly fickle the airline industry can be.是什么原因导致了这种未能从过去的经验中吸取教训的原因？我的信念是，行业内的整合减少了航空公司之间在机票价格上的竞争，这让巴菲特确信，这个时代将有所不同，并为股东带来有吸引力的回报。这可能是真的。但新冠病毒表明，航空业是多么善变。

SUMMARY

“To invest successfully does not require a stratospheric IQ, unusual business insights, or inside information. What is needed is a sound intellectual frame- work for making decisions and the ability to keep emotions from corroding the framework,” Buffett wrote in the preface to the Intelligent Investor.“成功投资不需要平流层智商、不寻常的商业洞察力或内幕信息。我们需要的是一个健全的决策知识框架，以及防止情绪腐蚀框架的能力，“巴菲特在《聪明的投资者》的序言中写道。

Most of Buffett’s mistakes come from times when he failed to hew to his own intellectual framework for decision-making. Despite these expensive errors, Berkshire Hathaway’s track record still boasts some of the highest investment returns ever recorded. Buffett himself believes that mistakes in investing are unavoidable. The key is to learn from them and avoid repeating them.巴菲特的大部分错误都来自他未能遵循自己的决策知识框架。尽管存在这些代价高昂的错误，但伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的业绩记录仍然拥有有史以来最高的投资回报。巴菲特本人认为，投资中的错误是不可避免的。关键是要向他们学习，避免重复。

The most reliable way for investors to do this is to become aware of the various biases at play in decision-making. We all have them—even Buffett. But if you keep track of your mistakes, it is possible to identify blind spots and correct for them.对于投资者来说，最可靠的方法是意识到决策中的各种偏见。我们都有，甚至巴菲特。但是，如果您跟踪自己的错误，就有可能识别盲点并纠正它们。